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There is currently something of a crisis in democracy, we are told, with many countries experiencing an 'erosion of confidence in the institutions of representative democracy ' (Norris, 1999, p. 257) . One of the consequences of this growing cynicism, she suggests, is a decline in 'conventional participation: discouraging electoral turnout, political activism, and civic engagement'. The extent of the decline in turnout can be exaggerated, however: some studies have identified no overall trend since 1945 in the 'established democracies' (p. 258), although an IDEA (1997) study did find a 'modest dip' averaging around 6 percentage points since the 1970s. The United Kingdom only partially fits this description. Average turnout at general elections fell from highs of over 82 per cent at the two elections of 1950 and 1951 to a range between 71 and 78 per cent thereafter, but with no evidence of a secular trendalthough the lowest postwar turnout rate did occur in the last of the twentieth century's general elections (71.2 per cent in 1997).
Irrespective of whether the low turnout in 1997 indicates a crisis in British democracy, it is clearly of concern, especially when considered in conjunction with other low turnout rates at elections in the late 1990s This paper explores why people vote at general elections, in the context of rational voter models, especially Downs's (1957) classic work. His chapter on 'The causes and effects of rational abstention' set out several propositions, including:
1. When voting is costless, every citizen who is indifferent abstains and every citizen who has any preferences whatsoever votes; 2. If voting is costly, it is rational for some indifferent citizens to vote and for some citizens with preferences to abstain; … 4. The cost of information acts in effect to disenfranchise low-income groups relative to high-income groups when voting is costly; … and 6. It is sometimes rational for a citizen to vote even when his short-run costs exceed his short-run returns, because social responsibility produces a long-run return.
Evaluating these relies on measures of some of the important concepts embraced, such as the cost of voting. Downs notes (1957, p. 265 ) that … every act takes time. In fact, time is the principal cost of voting: time to register, to discover what parties are running, to deliberate, to go to the polls, and to mark the ballot. Since time is a scarce resource, voting is inherently costly.
In deciding whether to commit time to voting, therefore, electors have to evaluate the benefits that might accrue relative to the costs. Downs (1957, p. 267) argues that this produces a 'maze of conjectural variation'; for each elector 'the importance of his own vote depends upon how important others think their votes are, which in turn depends on how important he thinks his vote is'. Individuals may determine that their vote has so little value (i.e. is so unlikely to affect the outcome) that voting is not worthwhile -in which case nobody turns out and democracy collapses. Alternatively, they might argue that if others reach that conclusion too, few will vote and those that do will have a significant impact on the outcome; in that case everybody who is not indifferent to the outcome will vote, and will then discover that their vote has little weight, and so will adopt the first position next time -and eventually democracy collapses!
